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A Survey of Perspectives on Intergovernmental Relations:
A Comparative Analysis of the Czech and Slovak Republics:
Part I.
Introduction
The transition from Marxist-Leninist Socialism to market-oriented democracy has been a difficult one for
most of the countries of east and central Europe. Many observers view that process as consisting largely of the
privatization of state-owned enterprises and the establishment of market relations in the countries involved. But the
transition of the public sector in countries once managed by central planning regimes has also been a very important
and difficult part of that historic development. The public sector under central planning was highly centralized so
that the party could maintain a tight monopoly over the country’s decision-making powers. Thus, democratization
has required a process of fiscal decentralization to restore some autonomy to local government. Bryson and Cornia
(2000) outline the development and difficulties of the initial, somewhat lukewarm attempts of the Slovak and Czech
Republics to pursue fiscal decentralization. The efforts of other transition states, reviewed by the OECD (2002),
show Hungary, for example, with somewhat greater success than the Czechs and Slovaks have enjoyed, but all the
transition countries have struggled in this endeavour. The total level of sub-national revenues and expenditures as a
share of GDP has been lower in the transitioning countries than in the earlier members of the EU. The expenditures
of the transitional, newer EU members have averaged only 8% of GDP, whereas they represent 16% of GDP for the
older EU members; the differences in subnational revenues are smaller, but similarly skewed. Subnational revenues
represent only 19% of the GDP of the transitional countries, but 27% of the GDP of the older members (OECD,
2002, p. 4).
The Czech and Slovak Republics began the process of fiscal decentralization together, but separated in
1993. They then continued along their separate but similar paths and both countries apparently required additional
efforts to devolve power. The European Union therefore encouraged them to undergo “reforms of public
administration” before their 2004 accession to the community. That period was characterized for both countries by
intergovernmental fiscal institutions that reflected a rather high degree of centralism. Consequently, one encounters
in the Czech and Slovak Republics these related characteristics – transfers from the centre represent almost a totality
of the revenues of local budgets; revenue generation reflects low local fiscal effort; and “own revenues” yields at the
level of sub-national government are very modest.
The importance of fiscal decentralization has been acknowledged by both of these young democracies, but
the actual accomplishments have been modest. The “reforms of public administration” achieved some positive
organizational change in the Czech Republic, but ultimately accomplished little more than the establishment of
regional governments (the kraje). In the Slovak Republic reforms were more comprehensive and observers
expected a good deal from them. They will be discussed later, but elections and the arrival of a new political
coalition in Slovak governance brought some uncertainty as to where the decentralization initiatives would go.
In both countries, the legacies of socialism and the general European disinclination to insist on
decentralized political institutions have resulted in the survival of some of the centralism of the previous era. The
centre’s concern for the many small local governments, which lack the resources adequately to provide for their own

1

management, has been at least partially responsible for the development of a fiscal system that can scarcely be
described as having achieved fiscal decentralization. In studies sponsored by the World Bank, we find municipal
governments in both Republics enjoying only limited autonomy from 1989 to about 2000 (Oliveira and MartinezVazques, 2001 and Bryson and Cornia, 2001).1
The Property Tax in the Czech and Slovak Republics
The primary cause for the lack of genuine municipal autonomy in both republics is the lack of an
independent source of revenue. The survey focused at several points on the Czech Real Estate Tax, which is as close
to a western property tax as the Republic has been willing or able to come. As a potential independent revenue
source, the property tax is a most significant tax for local governments. Although it can give municipalities more
autonomous control over their own fiscal affairs, it has not been developed to its potential in either the Czech or
Slovak Republic, although the latter has shown a greater willingness to consider serious change in the property tax.
It has failed to provide adequate revenues, which it could do with minimal distortion of private allocation processes.
Because this tax is highly visible and because Marxist-Leninist regimes were of limited credibility, it was retained at
strictly nominal levels during the socialist era. But in spite of this legacy and the natural tendency of any citizenry to
oppose property taxes, there is much to recommend them. A tax on real property will make good sense as part of the
tax system as a whole because of its efficiency and equity aspects (Oates, 1996)
The country-specific fiscal institutions involved play a major role in determining the effectiveness of a
property tax. Who establishes tax policy and who administers the tax are both very important questions. The Slovak
Republic retained the basic institutions of the Real Estate Tax after the Velvet Divorce in 1993, one of the most
important being that the design of the tax is by the central government. The other important characteristic of the task
is that, unlike the Czechs, the Slovaks permitted the municipalities to be responsible for collection of the tax. In the
Czech Republic, the centre collects the tax without having strong incentives to do it well (since all the revenue goes
to the municipalities.) This unsatisfactory outcome reveals a problem of moral hazard (see Bryson and Cornia,
2003). Slovakia’s municipalities harvest their own property tax revenues much more effectively. If all revenues are
generated from the centre, will they be made available without the accompanying influence of the centre? Can one
speak of genuine fiscal decentralisation if local governments enjoy only limited fiscal autonomy? Central and east
Europe’s countries in transition have perceived a fairly standard set of taxes and user fees to be well suited for their
local governments. The Czechs and Slovaks have not generally felt the property tax should be increased from the
low, rather symbolic levels of the communist period. Current levels, however, are not sufficient to fund municipal
services or perform the necessary administrative tasks.
If municipalities in the twin republics wish to augment available revenues, they must seek opportunities
from sources other than taxation. They may generate revenue from the privatization of public properties or they can
incur debt. But the privatisation of public properties exploits a non-recurring revenue source and cannot yield a
sustainable cash flow; municipal loans can become dangerously burdensome.
The base and the rate determine the real estate tax yield of both republics. Both land and buildings are
included in the base, each being valued separately. National law prescribes the process by which the actual value of
property is to be determined; the tax base reflects the floor space of buildings and the area of land plots. Also
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determined by the centre, tax rates differ for buildings and for land. The taxable value of land plots and buildings is
basically a function of their areas in square meters, so valuation is not based on market prices. This may have been
unavoidable for much of the transition period, but the real estate market has now developed to a point where that
could be changed. The tax rate and coefficient for real estate parcels reflect their size, location, and use. These
characteristics determine the amount of the real estate tax that will be assessed. In parts of some larger cities, such
exemptions represent a major share of the potential tax revenues. There are other instances in the tax policies of
transition countries where social welfare concerns have led to exemptions which might imperil the sufficiency of tax
revenues.2
Table 1 provides a brief history of Czech budgets, both national and local. Although Czech municipal
budgets are fairly well funded as compared to other transition countries, Czech cities and towns certainly do not
enjoy soft budget constraints. The municipalities of the Slovak Republic have enjoyed greater autonomy, but also
enjoy far less revenue. The aggregate of Czech local budgets represented no more than 25% of the national budget
in 1993. That share grew rather continually, although it stagnated at about thirty percent from 1997 through 1999,
reaching a high of 32.6% in the year 2000.
Table 1 here
What stands out in the data of Table 1 is the relative insignificance of the real estate tax in the Czech
Republic. The state is unwilling to change the property tax, which remains only symbolic and at low levels of
revenue. Nor do the local governments successfully apply any pressure on the centre to increase its collection
efforts. It is easier simply to accept the revenue-sharing and grants the central government offers. Because the state
provides all the revenues for municipal investment projects, it alone determines which projects will be funded. Hope
for municipal political independence, obviously a function of the accessibility of independent financial sources,
cannot be derived from current Czech intergovernmental fiscal relations. Only in 1994 did real estate tax provide in
excess of three percent of the total revenues available to local governments. Otherwise, from 1993 to 2000 its share
was between two and three percent. After 2000 the declining proportion fell below two percent. Other municipal
revenue sources have increased while the real estate tax decreased. It is important to keep these facts in mind when
reviewing local perceptions of intergovernmental fiscal relations; regardless of those perceptions, local Czech
budgets provide for as little autonomy as they do for “own funds,” i.e., for independent funding sources.
For the Republic of Slovakia, the fiscal story is similar to that of the Czechs; the total revenues going to
Slovakia’s cities and towns as transfers of shared taxes and grants from the centre have been considerably less
generous. Being in charge of their own property tax collections, aggressive Slovak municipalities have generally
derived around 10% of their budget revenues from the real estate tax. The recent reforms of the Slovak government,
beginning with the reform of public administration, have been substantially bolder than those of the Czechs.
Additional legislation related to fiscal decentralisation was produced in September, 2004 (Ministry of Finance,
Republic of Slovakia, 2005). According to the Act on Budgetary Definition of Tax Yield, municipalities receive as
their share of the personal income tax, 70.3% of the revenues of that tax, while the regions (“Upper-tier Territorial
Units) 23.5%, and the central government retains only 6.2%. Previously considered subsidies, these are now
considered own revenues of the subnational governments. The real estate tax was scheduled to reach about 14% of
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the revenues of municipal budgets for the year 2007 and the door was opened to greater independence for
municipalities in designing their own property tax systems (Bryson and Cornia, 2006).

Genesis of the Survey
In the course of researching issues of fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations in the
twin republics, we had numerous opportunities to hear the views of Finance Ministry and other central government
officials. But it seemed important also to gain an understanding of how these issues were perceived by municipal
officers. In our limited contacts with them we had received impressions of dissatisfaction with the level of funds
they were receiving and with their dependence on the centre for nearly all their revenues. With the help of the
associations of cities and towns in the two countries, a questionnaire was developed for mayors and city managers
that would reveal some of the important local perceptions and preferences on these fiscal issues. We proceed now
by introducing the questionnaire and discussing the participants. We then address four core issues, each being
represented by a small set of individual questions:
1. The perceptions of municipal officials on their autonomy and the sufficiency of funds available to them,
2. Whether public services are provided by the appropriate level of government,
3. The potential benefits of adopting a serious rather than a nominal property tax, and
4. The issue of budget flexibility in Czech and Slovak cities and towns.
These issues are addressed in two parts. In Section II we consider survey questions that revealed
statistically significant differences between Slovak and Czech responses, whereas Section III reviews questions for
which the responses of Czech and Slovak officials did not differ with any statistical significance. Because the two
countries began as one, the historical legacy, the laws, customs and traditions that formed many of the municipal
leaders were the same. Therefore, differences in attitudes on particular issues would rather closely reflect more
recently developing differences in policy and the unique texture of intergovernmental fiscal relations within each of
the two countries. Some interesting and important differences are indeed observed in the responses of local officials
of the two countries, but the similar histories, traditions, financial situations and backgrounds are similar enough to
produce statistically comparable responses in a number of instances. Section IV presents evaluation and
conclusions.

The Survey and the Respondents
A survey of some of the local perceptions of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the Czech and Slovak
Republics was designed to solicit the responses of local officials. The questionnaire developed over time and
ultimately benefited from extensive input from the Association of Towns and Cities in Bratislava (Združenie miest a
obcí Slovenska, or ZMOS) and the Union of Towns and Municipalities of the Czech Republic (Svaz měst a obcí
České republiky, or SMO). The questionnaire was taken on line by local Czech and Slovak officials in December of
2005 at the Surveyz.com/Qualtrics.com website. The lion’s share of the participants were mayors. There were 84
responses to the Slovak language version and 456 to the Czech language version. 3 Respondents were asked whether
they agreed, agreed strongly, disagreed, disagreed strongly with, or were neutral (unwilling or unable to respond)
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regarding various statements pertaining to the most significant fiscal issues. Some of the questions of the survey
were designed to compare some of the perceptions of local leaders to views commonly discussed in the scholarly
literature on fiscal decentralization.
The literature on the fiscal situation of sub-national governments in the countries transitioning from central
planning regimes to market democracy reports a high degree of fiscal centralization. In the twin republics, transfers
from the central government are the dominant, nearly exclusive source of revenues; low local fiscal effort and very
meager “own” revenues generated at the municipal level are characteristic. Since the economic transition began in
Europe over fifteen years ago, fiscal decentralization has been viewed by the transition literature as essential to
democratic development. It is one of the primary means of ensuring the efficiency of public services as government
is brought closer to the people (Tanzi 1991; Litvack, Ahmand, and Bird 1998). Decentralization elicits heavy
support from the public finance, public choice, and public management literatures (Tiebout 1956; Bish and Kirk
1974) because it makes public decision making more transparent and accountable; it permits citizens to participate
effectively and at reasonable cost in local governance (Oates 1998).
Bryson and Cornia (2001, 2001a) have written of the socialist and developmental legacies in Slovakia and
of the transformation era in the Czech Republic, emphasizing the centralist traditions of Stalinist economic planning
from the previous era and the tendency of most transitional central governments to retain a good deal of directive
control. The primary objective of the survey was to determine how participants at the municipal level view
intergovernmental relations, i.e., whether from the perspective of local authorities a substantive measure of fiscal
decentralization has actually been achieved.
The participants of the survey were from cities and towns of widely diverse sizes; accordingly, the budgets
involved ranged from small to very large. There were, however, many more respondents from smaller cities and
towns than from the very large cities. Two of the survey’s final questions addressed these issues. Here, as in the
sections that follow, an analysis of the response follows each question presented.
Question 19. The anticipated receipts of our municipality this year will be approximately _____________
CZK (or SKK). Last year’s receipts were __________ CZK or (SKK).
Of the Czech respondents, 363 gave an estimate of municipal receipts expected for the year 2005. The average of
total anticipated receipts for the Czech Republic’s participating cities and towns was approximately 238 million
Czech crowns (CZK).4 The highest reported receipts were a little over 58 billion CZK, while a few of the very
lowest receipts were from around a quarter million CZK to half a million. For the previous year, average reported
receipts had been well over 349 million CZK, so these officials were anticipating smaller receipts for 2005 than for
the previous year.
Of the 54 local officials from Slovakia responding to this question, average anticipated receipts for the year
were just less than 90 million Slovak crowns (SKK). A small number reported receipts as low as about a quarter
million SKK, while the highest reported was 657 million SKK. Average receipts for the previous year had been a
little over 85 million SKK.
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Question 20. My position in the municipality.
Of the Czech respondents, 83 % were mayors, 2% were city managers, 5% were financial managers, and
the remaining 10% held other positions. The larger share of the Slovak respondents, 61%, consisted of mayors.
Another 7% were city managers, 21% were economists and the remaining 11% filled other positions.

II: The Differences in Slovak and Czech Responses
We will be concerned in this part about those responses which reflect fundamental perceptive and
attitudinal differences between the respondents from the Czech and the Slovak Republics. We will observe that the
differences are not generally reflective of fundamental variation in the cultures of these cousin countries, but are
usually determined by policy differences in specific situations.
1. Some perceptions of local autonomy and the sufficiency of the funds available to local officials.
In this section responses relate to the perceived autonomy of the participants and to their views as to the
adequacy of their municipality’s level of funding. Since the responsibility of local officials for generating revenues
is rather light, especially in the Czech Republic, they need not be terribly concerned about their own fiscal effort in
generating revenue yields. They are far more concerned about whether the funds transferred by the central
government in the form of shared taxes or grants are sufficient for the provision of public services. A major concern
is the provision of funds from the centre to pursue mandated projects and activities. Where demands for services
place heavy pressures on local officials, one would expect that they would consider loans, credits and deficit
spending as possible means of overcoming fiscal shortfalls. These will also be discussed in this section.
Table 2 here
In the Czech Republic the traditional wisdom of central government officials is that since law prohibits
unfunded mandates from the centre, they simply don’t occur. Table 2 presents a more realistic picture. When asked
whether this traditional wisdom fits their experience, 52% of local officials disagreed and another 28% strongly
disagreed with the statement. Only 48% of Slovak respondents disagreed with the observation.
Of Slovak local officials, 38% agreed that they had not experienced unfunded mandates (as opposed to
11% of Czech respondents). For this question, a T-test of country differences indicates a statistically significant
difference in the means between the Czech and Slovak Republics. Inspection of the significance of Levine’s test for
equality of variances in Table 3 also shows a statistically significant difference in the variance of the two samples.
Table 3 here
Unfortunately, there are gaps between the reality and the theoretical literature strongly endorsing fiscal
decentralization and prescribing at least some measure of local fiscal autonomy as the essential outcome of
decentralization. It has been widely perceived that local governments in transition countries have faced burdensome
unfunded mandates with woefully inadequate funds (Bahl and Wallace 1994).
Officials of the Czech Finance Ministry deny that unfunded mandates are given to the sub-national
governments of the Republic, basically because it is against the law. To “delegate” new responsibilities without
transferring the necessary resources to perform them simply increases the demand for transfers or subsidies in
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whatever form. Doing so also tends to keep the municipalities dependent on the central government. Oliveira and
Martinez-Vazquez (2001) agree that the Czech Republic has a generally good record for avoiding substantial,
unfunded mandates on its local governments. Some projects and activities have been funded through specific grants,
which would not have been supplied in some of the other transitioning countries.
There have been, as we note by the responses to the survey, obvious exceptions to the favorable Czech
performance. When the responsibility for issuing personal identification cards and passports was transferred to local
governments, they objected because the funds were not transferred. Probably the most important case of unfunded
mandates in the Czech Republic occurred at the outset of the transition period when the central government
transferred the responsibility for and privatization of public housing to local governments. No funds were transferred
along with the responsibility to maintain and upgrade the seriously substandard housing stock. Moreover, retaining
control over the pricing of transferred service responsibilities only added insult to injury; in effect, it simply supplied
another form of unfunded mandate. This kind of policy selection helps explain the soft budget constraint that has to
develop for local governments in such a situation as well as the occasional need for bailouts. 5 Under-funded
municipalities cannot be expected to meet financial obligations if imposed financial requirements exceed available
funds. They become hostage to their administrative directors in central government, but at the same time they also
avoid full financial responsibility for program failures.
The responses to this question are exceptionally interesting. We would have expected that the more
generous Czech government would be far less inclined to issue unfunded mandates than the Slovak government. But
the Czech respondents far more emphatically disagreed with this survey question’s assertion that mandates are not
unfunded than did their counterparts from the Slovak Republic. That would mean either that the Czech offenses are
more egregious than we would have expected or that Czech officials, less accustomed to the more severe financial
struggles of the Slovaks, have a more negative perception than justified by the reality.
When Czech local leaders were asked whether they had sufficient revenues to cover their municipality’s
operating costs, 63% agreed (and another 11% agreed strongly) that they did. As Table 4 shows, only 50% of Slovak
Local Leaders agreed (and another 2% agreed strongly) that their revenues covered operating costs, while 40%

Table 4 here
disagreed. It is significant that 25% of the Czech respondents complained of budgets too small to cover operating
costs. The Slovak Republic’s budgets, smaller yet, caused 40% of respondents to claim inability to cover operating
costs from their budgets. That represents substantial deviation from the Czech responses. This is the first question to
which the Czech and Slovak local official responses differed significantly. This is the first of the questions for which
a T-test of country differences indicates a statistically significant difference in the means between the Czech and
Slovak Republics. Levine’s test for equality of variances reported in Table 5, however, shows no statistically
significant difference in group variances.
Table 5 here
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2. Whether the mix of public services assigned to government levels is appropriate.
This section of the survey also inquired as to whether the local governments of the twin republics supply some
services that would be more logically and effectively provided at a higher governmental level. On the other hand,
central governments sometimes provide services that would be better provided by subnational governments. This
issue is addressed by Questions 8 and 9, reviewed in Table 6. Interestingly, these questions could have been
expected to encounter controversial views among the respondents, since in both countries the state routinely
performs local service provision functions under the rubric “state administration.”
The foundation documents of both countries define state administration as the set of municipal and
subnational governance functions assigned to and performed strictly under the direction of the central government.
Municipal and regional “self-government” (samospravy) consists of the remainder of the local functions actually
assigned to the subnational governments to perform. It is important to recognize that the sovereignty of subnational
governments is restricted to the performance of that limited set of constitutionally assigned functions and services.
It is thus somewhat ironic that twenty two percent of Czech respondents thought some of the services their
municipality supplies would be better supplied by regional or central government. Fifty-four percent felt that none
of the services they supplied could be better supplied by a higher level of government. Of Slovak local officials, a
similar share, 31%, thought some of their services would be better supplied by regional or central government. A
much larger 52% felt that none of the services they supply would be better supplied by the central or regional
governments. Only 29% of local Slovak officials felt none of the services supplied by their municipality could
actually be better supplied by a higher level of government. That a strong minority of the officials of both countries
believe they supply some services that should be supplied by higher levels is indicative of the thorough
entrenchment of the notion of state administration. These people would even extend the list of municipal tasks
confiscated by the central government from local jurisdiction. Even more surprising is the fact that substantial
minorities in both countries see some services that they believe would be better supplied by the regions or by the
central government.
Table 6 here
T-tests of the means of the samples of the two republics demonstrated a statistically significant difference,
as expected, since a glance at the two country responses shows nearly 80% of Czechs disagreeing or disagreeing
strongly with the statement that local governments never supply services better supplied by the central or regional
government. Levine’s test is significant (F = 3.938, P=.048, Mean.cz = 2.63, Mean.sl = 2.73, Slovakia’s standard
error is large).

3. The potential benefits of adopting a serious rather than a nominal property tax.
It is unlikely that a country’s municipalities could enjoy fiscal autonomy while remaining totally dependent upon
revenues provided by the central government. The centre may be willing to provide such revenues, but it may well
attach spending directives to them. The attached strings imply less local autonomy. This section reviews how a
property tax of considerably greater significance than the almost strictly symbolical one currently imposed in the
Czech and Slovak Republics might be received and perceived by local authorities. Both republics have basically
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three sources of own revenues: the real estate tax, a limited menu of local taxes and fees, and the sale of public
properties. As currently constituted, none of these provide significant amounts of revenues; local fees provide well
under 5% of local revenues and public properties sales cannot continue indefinitely to provide revenues. Therefore,
if a genuine, substantive property tax were introduced in these countries, autonomous local revenues would clearly
be increased. The fundamental question here is whether a local authority has a revenue source or sources
independent of the central government.
Question 13. Roughly what share of total revenues is derived from transfers from the central government?
This item is designed to give an indication as to the level of accessible own revenues municipalities enjoy. A fairly
large number of the survey participants, both Czech and Slovak, failed to respond to this question, although the
request was for an approximation or even an impression rather than an accurate, documentable answer. For the 310
Czechs who did respond, however, the mean of the estimates was that 56.9 per cent of total revenues came through
transfers from the central government. Taking an average of the responses of fifty-three local officials from
Slovakia, 58.5% of their municipalities’ total revenues came in the form of central government transfers.
What share of the total transfers received could be spent strictly at the discretion of local officials?
We were tempted not to report on question 13, since only thirty-one Czechs and 22 Slovaks responded.
One has to reflect on why so few responded to such an important question. Perhaps many had not really thought
about this issue. Perhaps some felt that they couldn’t answer accurately with the precision that they might have felt
the question deserves. Some may have simply wanted “not to go there” because the question is a sensitive one.
Statistically speaking, there were enough responses to review. The average of their subjective estimates of the nonmandated expenditures was 51.3%. The 22 responding Slovak local officials provided an average estimate of the
share of those transfers not encumbered by mandates of 36.6%. Levine’s test for equality of variances in Table 7
showed statistically significant differences between the Czech and Slovak groups’ responses (F = 5.604, P = 0.018).
Table 7 here
An inquiry concerning impressions about what shares of transfers carry mandates is likely to produce a
rather subjective response. In some instances a mandate will not explicitly accompany a transfer, but will
nevertheless be understood and generally adhered to. The less fiscally-humble Czech municipal officers may be
more prepared on occasion to give their government the benefit of the doubt. If this survey was such an occasion,
the statistical difference might reflect an impression more than a reality. But such subjectivism aside, we have
evidence here of a significantly smaller portion of transfers in the Czech Republic bearing mandates.
Question 12. If we had a real estate tax similar to that in England or the United States, it should be
administered by local government, regional government (not included in Czech version), central government
Czech Republic: Local government, 63%; Central government, 37%
Slovak Republic: Central government, 0%; Regional government, 10%; Local Government, 90%
The difference in these responses is large. Over a third of the Czech respondents did not believe a property
tax should be locally administered. This is doubtless because the Czech central government administers the tax,
collecting the revenue and redistributing it to the municipalities. And the Czechs receive only nominal revenues
from the property tax, but receive enough other revenues from the centre to feel compensated on net. Their response
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seems to reflect an attitude that own revenues are not a concern if the government provides sufficient revenues from
other sources.
The Slovaks collect their own property tax and have made strong efforts to maximize the revenues thus
derived. None of the Slovak respondents felt that the central government should administer the property tax and
90% felt that local governments should do so. As seen in Table 8, the t-test for mean differences in the two samples
reveals a statistically significant difference in the two countries’ responses. Moreover, Levine’s test of difference in
sample variances shows that equal variances likewise should not be assumed. Thus, the Czech and Slovak responses
Table 8 here
to this question were as from two distinctly separate populations. It would appear that local politicians generally
accept the institutional rules of the game as played in their country, sometimes even coming to the point of view that
such local institutions are unquestionably right and proper.
Still, consensus thinking is that successful decentralization requires more than just forming subnational
governments; it also requires that those governments have access to funding for basic services and even to a local
and autonomous source of funding (Kelly 1994). This implies that local governments should administrate the
property tax. The public finance literature suggests that the property tax embodies the positive characteristics
required of a local tax. It is the economist’s local tax of choice because its base is immobile, its revenue is stable,
economically it is potentially neutral, and politically it is visible (Musgrave 1993 and Oates 1996). The tax
assignment literature accepts the property tax as the ideal local tax (McClure 1983).
It is not surprising that over a third of Czech municipal offers are not averse to the current system, which
requires no fiscal effort on their part. Having become accustomed to having their funds simply appear and bearing
responsibility only for expenditures, many feel that this is the way the world should work. Virtually none of the
Slovak respondents felt that central government should bear the responsibility of managing the property tax,
although ten percent would not be averse to having the regional government accept the responsibility.
Table 9 here
The fundamental question is whether a local authority has a revenue source or sources independent of the
central government. When confronted by Question 11 about the property tax (see Table 9), 47% of Czech officials
agreed that it has the potential of being a source of “considerable revenue” for local governments, and another 19%
said they strongly agreed. A large 24%, however, declared they were unable or unwilling to say whether they were
in agreement or disagreement. An almost identical 67% of Slovak local officials felt the property tax could be a
source of considerable revenue with 12 percent strongly agreeing. An almost identically large group of 26% agreed
with the 24% of Czech respondents who were unable or unwilling to say.
Only 18% of the Czech respondents disagreed with the proposition that revenues from a property tax would
have greater value (assuring greater autonomy) than the same amount of shared taxes transferred from the central
government (with probable strings attached). The responses appear in Table 9. 42% agreed and another 10% agreed
strongly about the potential value of the real estate tax; a large 29% were undecided. Of the Slovak respondents,
who have been far more dependent upon property tax revenues than the Czechs, only 34% agreed that the revenues
from a decentralized property tax would be of greater worth than shared taxes transferred from the centre. 36% of
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Slovak local officials disagreed (twice as large a share as in the Czech Republic) that such revenues would be better
than shared taxes and 31% were undecided. An informed interpretation of these responses would have to take into
account that the Slovaks have been heavily dependent on property tax yields and have actually been involved in the
Table 10 here
collection of the revenues. To be spared the heavy effort thus expended would be appreciated. In this respect a
large, costless transfer of funds from the central government would be a better outcome. The symbolic cost of
significant tax revenue efforts may be artificially high for the Czechs, not having ever actually been forced to make
them. A property tax may be of more value to those who perceive that it allows greater decision autonomy.
For the responses to this question, a t-test for divergent means reveals a statistically significant difference in
the mean responses of the two countries. The Levine test (Table 10) did not show a significant difference in variance
(F = .569, P = .451).

III. The Similarities in Czech and Slovak Survey Responses

1. Perceptions of local autonomy and the sufficiency of the funds available to local officials.
Our discussion in this section will follow the same ordering of the core issues or complexes of questions. We now
address a different set of responses, viz, those showing no statistically significant differences between the local
officials of the Czech and Slovak Republics. For the responses of this section, T-tests for differences in means
revealed no significant difference in sample means for Czech and Slovak respondents.
The first question, reviewed in Table 11, is the most general one posed on the issue of municipal autonomy.
It appears to have been, without considerable reflection, interpreted as: “Despite any potential action of the centre,
do I have a meaningful job to do? Do I have important decisions to make?” No less than 67% of all Czech
respondents agreed with this statement (27% of these did so strongly). Of all the Slovak local leaders, 67% were
also in agreement (11% of these strongly).
Table 11’s more specific questions 2 and 10 appear to have stimulated more reflection and the focus of
these questions was not seen as the decision functions of the local leaders but as the system which gave them less
autonomy than they would like. Of Czech respondents, 84% agreed (33% strongly) that their autonomy would be
“much greater” if they were not so dependent upon the centre for financial flows. Only 11% disagreed with this
assertion. Slovak local leaders were likewise in agreement (55% agreed and another 25% agreed strongly), so that a
total of 80% thought independence would be much greater if financial dependence were less. 6
The literature suggests that little real decentralization had been achieved through most of the transition
period and that the municipal governments of the Czech and Slovak Republics from 1989 to 2000 or so enjoyed
little autonomy, with the picture changing somewhat in terms of its promise since then.
Returning to the theme of local autonomy, question 10 evoked a 52% Czech response that, despite facing
many required expenditures, they have sufficient funds to enjoy “budget autonomy and discretion.” A strong 45%
could not agree that they have budget autonomy. This is in clear contrast to the response to question 1. In part, this
question was to test whether some local officials might confuse autonomy with budget sufficiency, which some
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appear to have done. Of local officials in Slovakia, only 40% felt they had such autonomy. Once again, we see the
impact of the smaller Slovak municipal budgets on local officials’ views in that country.
Table 11 here
Autonomy is, of course, largely a subjective perception. Local governments enjoying fiscal autonomy will
likely experience a significant measure of political autonomy. There may be instances, however, where a healthy
measure of political autonomy is possible even without independent fiscal resources. Given a substantial democratic
tradition like that, for example, of the Netherlands, local authorities will confidently insist on political autonomy,
even if they receive most of their funds from central authority. Central authority will rarely attempt to mandate its
own preferences on local provision of public goods and services. But where the tradition is a centralist, nondemocratic one, it is far less likely to be overcome by having the centre provide all the funding of local goods and
services. Central authority in formerly communist countries was not accustomed to restraints on powers and
preferences and local authorities were not inclined to demand the autonomy they lost for forty to sixty years of
central planning (Bryson and Cornia 2002).
Question 3 intentionally lacks precision. Its focus is on a subjective perception, so it is not significant
precisely what tasks were to be accomplished or who held the expectations mentioned. Of the Czech local leaders
52% disagreed with the assertion and another 34% disagreed strongly. Only 12% agreed that they always had
sufficient funds. Of the Slovak respondents, 85% disagreed with the query (of these 27% disagreed strongly). As
with municipal officials generally, there is clear insistence here that the budget is too small, and the Czechs, whose
budgets are considerably larger, obviously felt no less strongly than the Slovaks.
The public finance and fiscal decentralization literatures likewise make reference to the scarcity of
resources available to sub-national governments, a condition holding especially in the Slovak Republic during the
transition period. The condition stems back to the legacies and fiscal patterns established in the central planning
period (see Bird, Ebel and Wallich 1998 and Matoušková 1998). It has already been established that a problem of
moral hazard affects local fund-raising efforts negatively when municipalities can neither monitor nor influence
central collections efforts (Bryson and Cornia 2003).
The public finance and fiscal decentralization literatures likewise make reference to the scarcity of
resources available to sub-national governments, especially in the Slovak Republic, during the transition period. The
condition stems back to the legacies and fiscal patterns established in the central planning period (see Bird, Ebel and
Wallich 1998) and (Matoušková 1998). As mentioned earlier, a problem of moral hazard affects local fund-raising
efforts negatively when municipalities can neither monitor nor influence central property tax collection efforts
(Bryson and Cornia 2003).
When queried whether funds from all sources have permitted investments in capital facilities for “necessary
functions,” (Table 10, question 5) only 26% of Czech local officials were in agreement. A total of 71% disagreed,
of which 20% were in strong disagreement. Of Slovak local officials, only 21% agreed that they could make such
investments. 77% of them disagreed (61% disagreed and another 16% disagreed strongly) with the proposition.
Here again there is divergence for the two countries. The more modest Slovak budgets left Slovak local officials
slightly more strongly in disagreement with this proposition. Nevertheless, t-tests of differences in means and
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variances on the responses to this question by the two countries were not significantly different. So even though the
Czech municipalities have enjoyed significantly greater resources from transferred taxes and subsidies, they have
not perceived themselves better endowed with funds for investments in capital facilities. An explicit comparison of
the municipal and central government budgets of the two Republics in the transition period shows that the Czech
municipalities have enjoyed substantially greater revenues through transfers and subsidies than their less affluent
Slovak counterparts (Bryson and Cornia 2003, and Bryson, Cornia and Wheeler 2004).
Question 7 on the debt burden of the Czech Republic (see Table 12) lies outside the question sets on core
issues, but as one of the pillars of fiscal decentralization has obvious significance in its own right. Of Czech
respondents, 83% considered the level of local debt not to be inappropriate; they indicated that current debt levels
are not problematical in the fulfilment of municipal financial obligations (23% agreed strongly that this
is the case). Only 14% saw local debt as a financial problem for the municipalities. In Slovakia,
Table 12 here
62% of those responding to the questionnaire felt that debt was not a significant problem for municipalities and
another 15% felt that way strongly. Only 17% saw municipal debt as a significant problem for local governments.
The Czech government has shown some concern about local debt and has established regulations limiting
deficit local finance, but this is because of a more general concern with the national debt (which under EU
restrictions includes local debt). There is also specific concern for a very small number of local cases where debt has
been imprudently incurred and managed (Bryson 2006 and 2006a; Ježek, Marková, and Váňa 2004, and Kling and
Nižňanský 2004). The debt burden has generally been quite small, but it has grown somewhat over time. For the
interested reader, these sources provide considerable data on the debt situation in the two republics; unfortunately,
space considerations do not permit further elaboration here.
3. The potential benefits of adopting a serious rather than a nominal property tax.
All of the responses to questions in this core issue had answers with statistically significant differences.
4. The issue of budget flexibility in Czech and Slovak cities and towns
One view of budget flexibility and autonomy is that as resources available to municipalities increase over time,
municipal officials have more choice. They have an increased ability to provide the most urgently needed public
services and can spend more time making choices about what to do with additional funds that can provide greater
amenities. At an early stage of development, the concern is with finding funds sufficient to provide even the most
essential mandated services. Over time, greater funds provide greater budgetary choice and a sense of greater
autonomy in the selection of services desired by the local citizenry. This seems to explain the perspective of many of
our survey respondents. The authors, however, consider autonomy to be a function of making choices at every level
of development with fiscal independence being reflected in the disposition of funds without any strings attached,
funds raised by the municipality itself. Here, too, affluence provides greater budget flexibility, but we add the
consideration that own revenues provide some additional space for autonomy.
In addressing the issue of budget flexibility, expressed both in the planning and management of local budgets, we
search for some of the perceptions of autonomy such flexibilities help produce. Question 15 in Table 13 addresses
the flexibility of local budgeting and relates to the following proposition: where central strings are attached to shared
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taxes or grants, budget flexibility is reduced. Funds would then generally be spent for the exclusive purpose of the
transfer.
Table 13 here
Of Czech local officials, 47.4% agreed and 7.2% agreed strongly that they are able to use their funds
flexibly for different purposes according to their own preferences. But 19.8% of them disagreed and 2.2% disagreed
strongly that this option was open to them. In Slovakia, 54.3% agreed (of these, 12.6% did so strongly) that they
could draw from any revenue source freely for whatever purposes, but 28.3% disagreed and another 3.3% strongly
disagreed. Thus, somewhat fewer Slovaks saw budgeting for specific expenditures as a process of putting revenue
from all sources into a single pot, then drawing from the pot to finance their preferred expenditures.
Question 16 asks specifically about the “pooling revenue sources and spending with discretion”
(PRS/SWD) approach to budgeting. A chin-dropping 95% of Czech local officials claimed that they do this. In
Slovakia, local officials likewise claimed in large numbers (73% of their respondents agreed and another 19%
agreed strongly, which totals 92%) that this is how their budgeting is done.
Question 18. In your budget do you use the same funding sources to finance particular expenditures each
year?
Czech Republic: Yes 86%; No 7%
Slovak Republic: Yes 90%; No. 5%
Question 18 was designed to determine whether local officials tended to tap funds from specific sources for
designated purposes each budget year. Positive responses ranged from 86% (Czech) to 90% (Slovak) for this
question. This question represents another way of asking whether the PRS/SWD method is not applied. Using the
same revenue sources for the same expenditure purposes each year implies they are not pooling the funds, but taking
education expenditures from transferred education funds, highway expenditures from grants or credits for highways,
etc.
This seems to contradict responses to question 16, which indicate a pooling of financial resources to fund
the projects they will stretch to cover. It is likely that both questions were loosely interpreted in the minds of
respondents so that no contradiction was apparent to them. They seem to imply the following: “Yes, we add up all
the numbers to see how many projects can be financed and what services can be provided, but when we start
assigning expenditures, we obviously must keep an eye on important expenditures funded by grants requiring
specified funding levels.” In light of these responses, it appears we would have to look at specific budgets to draw
conclusions about which ones provide greater flexibility for budget officials.
This concludes the discussion of the survey questions. It is interesting that the answers were generally very
reflective and provided grist for considerable contemplation and analysis. But there were a few cases where the
respondents’ answers were shaded by emotional rather than reflective perceptions, as was the case when both
Czechs and Slovaks generally responded that they functioned in a wholly autonomous manner, but that it would be
nice if, in effect, their budgets were not hedged about with such extensive controls, limits, mandates and constraints.
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Many of our suspicions were confirmed through these responses, and many new insights gave rise to new questions
that can direct future research.

IV. Conclusions
The most significant differences in the responses of the Czech and Slovak local officials were as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The Czechs were more strongly convinced that they were victims of unfunded mandates.
A larger share of the Czechs agreed that the funds transferred to them by the central government were
sufficient to cover their current operating costs.
A slightly larger share of Slovak officials felt that they were supplying some public services that the central
government should supply.
A larger percentage of Czech respondents felt that their central government supplied no services that the
municipalities should be supplying.
Czech respondents believed a larger share of transferred funds could be spent at their own discretion than
respondents of the Slovak Republic (Table 12).
A larger share of the Czech officials (37%) felt a more significant property tax should be administered by
the central government than was the case for Slovak officials (0%).
A larger share of the Czech respondents were convinced that the revenues from a property tax planned and
designed by local self-governments would have a higher value to them than the same amount of revenues
offered from the central government in the form of shared taxes.

No statistically significant differences were found between the Czech and Slovak respondents (it was as though they
were from the same statistical population) regarding the following questions:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Our municipality could operate with much greater independence if we were not so dependent upon
financial transfers.
A strong majority of both groups disagreed with the statement that their municipality always had sufficient
funds to accomplish the tasks expected of them.
Strong majorities from both countries’ respondents agreed that funds received from all sources had not
permitted them to make investments in capital facilities that would provide such things as schools, social
services, and garbage collection at a satisfactory level in the future.
Strong majorities from both countries felt that municipal debt burdens did not provide significant problems
for their financial situations.
The majority of respondents from both countries felt that they had the budgeting flexibility to substitute
expenditures from other areas if funds fell short in a particular area of expenditures.
Very large majorities in both countries expressed the flexibility to pool all receipts and draw from the pool
to make desired expenditures, yet
Almost all the respondents indicated that they used the same funding sources to finance particular
expenditures each year.

Testing the general themes of fiscal decentralization against the perceptions of local officials in the Czech and
Slovak Republics was an instructive exercise. The responses to the survey were a reflection of fiscal reality from
the viewpoint of the insider as opposed to the outsider. The outside view has been that fiscal decentralization was an
absolute necessity after the hyper-centralization of the former era. The successive central governments of both
republics representing diverse political persuasions have paid lip service to the need for devolution of power, which
was necessary to work with interested political influences emanating from the OECD, NATO, WTO, IMF and, most
formidably, the EU. But sometimes policy and, even more especially, policy implementation has not clearly
promoted fiscal decentralization. To understand these countries, the political views of their central governments
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must be considered. But possibly an even more important input is that of local officials expressing their perception
of intergovernmental fiscal relations and subnational views on particular issues of fiscal decentralization.
It is extremely important to realize that the central government’s dominating role is constitutionally guaranteed
in the twin republics. The rather arbitrary assignment of “state administration” to the centre, i.e., the assignment to
the centre of many tasks normally considered municipal tasks, unnaturally limits the role of municipalities to
performing the residual menu of functions characterized as “self-government” (samospravy). This was presumably
done because of the concern of national policymakers that many municipalities are too small and resource poor to
function effectively.
When local officials are asked about the performance of their functions, it is apparent that the concept of state
administration is thoroughly rationalized in their psyche. In some respects they are perfectly content with having the
centre performing all those traditional functions that mayors (or governors) elsewhere would deem their rightful
political domain. Such public officials are somewhat like a housewife who has a maid to perform many tasks of
which she is most pleased to be relieved. But the question of sovereignty and ownership of rights should ultimately
arise. What will happen, for example, if the maid not only reduces the burdens of the housewife through the
performance of tedious and laborious tasks, but also begins removing the children of the household from private
schools and placing them in public schools and/or starts ordering new furniture for the house? Sometimes local
officials are delighted with having the centre responsible for performing tasks they could be “stuck with,” such as
when the Czech central government tells citizens how much property tax they must pay and then also collects it.
Sometimes local authorities chafe at central intervention; sometimes they embrace it. Intergovernmental fiscal
institutions can become a well-established tradition that seems to require no more justification than that they are
ordained by the constitution or national law.
The survey revealed that, according to the perceptions of local officials, their political autonomy is related to the
availability of sufficient funds both to meet contractual needs (such as the implementation of specific projects or the
delivery of particular, contracted public services) and to be able to have some choice in the selection of the activities
and services on the agenda. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, most of the transition period since 1989 has been
characterized by having very few resources that had not been supplied by central government. The lack of own
funds seems to the present authors to imply precious little autonomy, something supported by the fiscal
decentralization literature focusing on these two countries. But this is not apparently a huge problem for municipal
officials there. They would like more funds and apparently perceive that as the key to more choice; they are far less
anxious to have substantially increased own revenues to enhance choice, especially if they have to provide the fiscal
effort to produce such funds. There are, of course, many local officials who would not fit this general description
and who would be perfectly happy to accept the responsibility and the effort of pursuing autonomous sources of
funding. But the overall feeling is one of acceptance of the tradition as a fact of life not subject to political alteration.
A number of political implications seem to arise from these findings. Generally speaking, there is still
considerable room for more serious decentralization. The Republic of Slovakia seems to be pursuing this more
actively than the Czech Republic, which is momentarily preoccupied with pressing fiscal items at the central level;
excessively ambitious pension and health care aspirations have caused budget strains that press against EU
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institutional restraints. The Slovaks have similar problems, but are pursuing them with more creative fiscal
innovations that have been widely reported in the public media. There is plenty of room for the adoption of a variety
of additional user fees and a more serious property tax. Both of these are less likely for the intermediate term for the
Czech Republic.
Finally, when one considers the composition of the responses to our survey, it should be noted that the number
of respondents was tilted to smaller cities and towns. The number of large cities participating was not great and our
initial research indicates that some interesting findings might be teased out of the data by additional analysis
focusing more intently on city size. Such research will be forthcoming, but it need not be expected that it will negate
any of the findings of this paper.
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Table 1
National and Local Budgets for Select Years: Czech Republic

Year
Local Budget as % of National Budget
State Grants to Local Budgets*
Grants as % of Local Budgets
Total Local Revenues*
Local Budget Expenditures*
National Budget Tax Revenues*
Local Budget Tax Revenues*
Real Estate Tax*
RE Tax as % of Local Revs

1993
25.45
27.03
29.67
101
90.1
224.6
35.97
3.021
2.99

1995
29.34
33.28
25.77
129
132.3
255.4
70.679
3.799
2.95

1996
33.5
59.44
36.75
162
171.1
283
72.67
4.018
2.48

1998
30.8
37.39
23.79
162
158
495
83.32
4.108
2.53

1999
30.9
41.43
22.07
188
173
524
87.01
4.248
2.26

2000
32.6
46.05
25.33
181
190
544
95.81
4.437
2.44

2004
29.13
24.96
8.08
309
231
963
166.7
4.919
1.59

2005
28.78
31.6
9.44
335
246
1060
216.14
4.966
1.48

Table 2
Unfunded Mandates
Question 6. In my experience, no mandates from the central government have been given unless public moneys were
transferred to fund them. (The Czech version added: “This question does not refer to tasks of state administration.”)
CZ:
SA: 4%
A: 7%
U: 9%
D: 52%
SD: 28%
SR:
SA: 5%
A :33%
U :14%
D : 37%
SD : 11%
SA: Strongly Agree; A: Agree; U: Uncertain (Unable or unwilling to say); D: disagree; SD: strongly disagree.

Table 3
Test for Equality of Variances, Question 6
Levine's Test Equality of
Variances

Question
Number
6. Mandates
are Tied to
Funding

t-test for Equality of Means

Test
Assumption
Unequal
variances
assumed

F

Prob.

T

df

5.02

68.667

.000

.809

Sig.
(2tailed)
.161

Mean
Difference
.488

Std. Error
Difference
1.131
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2
3

17
4

Table 4
Resources to Cover Operating Costs
Question 4. From all financial resources, we receive at least enough revenue to cover our annual operating costs.
CZ: SA: 11%
A: 63%
U: 1%
D: 20%
SD: 5%
SR: SA: 2%
A: 50%
U: 8%
D: 40%
SD: 0%

Table 5
Test for Equality of Variances, Question 4

Levine's Test Equality of Variances
Question
Number
4. Revenue to
Cover
Operating
Costs

Test
Assumption
Equal
variances
assumed

F

Prob.

.118

.732

t-test for Equality of Means

T
-2.752

df

Sig. (2tailed)

437

.006

X dif
-.416

se dif
.151

Table 6
Questions on the Appropriate Service Supplier
Services Better Supplied by the Centre or Regions
Question 8. My local government never supplies services that would be better supplied by the central or regional
government. (In the Czech Survey: “This question does not include tasks of state administration.”)
CZ:
SR:

SA: 7.2%
SA: 10%

A: 47.4%
A: 42%

U: 23.4%
U: 17%

D: 19.8%
D: 28%

SD: 2.2%
SD: 3%

Appropriate Local Service Supply
Question 9. The central and/or regional governments supply no public services that would be better to supply
through independent, local governments.
CZ:
SR:

SA: 6.9%
SA: 7%

A: 48.7%
A: 22%

U. 21.7%
U: 33%

D: 20.6%
D: 33%

SD: 2.1%
SD: 5%
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Table 7
Test for Equality of Variances, Question 13
Central Government Revenue Percentage

Levine's Test Equality of
Variances
Question Number
13. Central
Government
Revenue
Percentage

Test
Assumption

F

Unequal
variances
Assumed

Prob.

5.604

.018

T
-3,591

t-test for Equality of Means
Sig. (2df
tailed)
X dif
77.752

.001

-15.92

SE dif
4.43277

Table 8
Test for Equality of Variances, Question 12
Levine's Test Equality of
Variances

Question Number
12. Locally
Administered
Real Estate Tax

Test
Assumption
Unequal
variances
assumed

F

Prob.

226.9

.000

t
12.348

t-test for Equality of Means
Sig.
(2Mean
df
tailed)
Difference
121.29

.000

.548

Std. Error
Difference
.044

Table 9
Questions on the Potential Value of the Property Tax
Property Tax as Revenue Source
Question 11. It seems logical to me that, as in England or the United States, a real estate tax, effectively designed
and administered, could be a source of considerable revenue for local governments.
CZ:
SR:

SA: 19%
SA: 12%

A: 47%
A: 55%

U: 24%
U: 26%

D: 9%
D: 7%

SD: 1%
SD: 0%

Perceived Value of Local property tax
Question 14. Revenues from a property tax planned and designed by local self-governments would have a higher
value to us than the same amount of revenues offered from the central government in the form of shared taxes.
CZ:
SR:

SA: 10%
SA: 10%

A: 42%
A: 24%

U: 29%
U: 31%

D: 16%
D: 29%

SD: 2%
SD: 7%
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Table 10
Test for Equality of Variances, Question 14
Levine's Test Equality of
Variances
Que

Question Number

14. Higher Value of Locally
15. Planned Tax

Test
Assumption
Equal
Variances
Assumed

F
0.569

Prob.
0.451

t
-2.931

t-test for Equality of Means
Sig. (2df
tailed)
X dif
433

.004

Se dif

-.401

.137

Table 11
Questions on Local Autonomy
Views on Autonomous Operation
Question 1. Although our municipality receives most of our revenues from the central government, we operate with
complete autonomy.
CZ:
SR:

SA: 14%
SA: 11%

A: 53%
A : 56%

U: 3%
U :2%

D: 24%
D : 27%

SD: 6%
SD : 3%

Dependence on Financial Transfers
Question 2. Our municipality could operate with much greater independence if we were not so dependent upon
financial transfers from the central government to fund our activities.
CZ:
SR:

SA:33%
SA:25%

A: 51%
A :55%

U: 5%
U :8%

D: 10%
D : 8%

SD: 1%
SD :3%

Sufficient Funds for Budget Autonomy
Question 10. Although we face many required expenditures, we still have enough funds to make me feel that we
have budget autonomy and discretion.
CZ:
SR:

SA: 4%
SA: 7%

A: 48%
A: 33%

U: 3%
U: 3%

D: 36%
D: 47%

SD: 9%
SD: 10%

“Sufficient” Funds
Question 3. Our municipality always has sufficient funds to accomplish the tasks expected of us.
CZ:
SR:

SA: 1%
SA: 0%

A: 11%
A: 12%

U: 2%
U: 3%

D: 52%
D: 58%

SD: 34%
SD: 27%

Funds for Capital Investments
Question 5. In the past ten years, funds we have received from all sources have permitted us to make investments in
capital facilities that will enable us to provide necessary functions such as schools, social services, and garbage
collection, at a satisfactory level in the future.
CZ:
SR:

SA: 3%
SA: 5%

A: 23%
A: 16%

U: 3%
U: 7%

D: 51%
D: 61%

SD: 20%
SD: 16%

23

Table 12
The Debt Burden
Question 7. The debt burden of our local self-government is appropriate and payments of principal and interest
during the repayment period do not cause significant problems with fulfillment of financial obligations which accrue
to us by extant legal norms.
CZ:
SR:

SA: 23%
SA: 15%

A: 60%
A: 62%

U: 3%
U: 7%

D: 12%
D: 12%

SD: 2%
SD: 5%

Table 13
Questions on Budget Flexibility

Expenditures Flexibility
Question 15. If expenses for one function, e.g., social care, increased rapidly, we could meet those costs by spending
less for one or more other functions, e.g., education, sport, culture or transportation, according to our own
preferences.
CZ:
SR:

SA: 7.2%
SA: 12.6%

A: 47.4%
A: 41.7%

U: 23.4%
U: 16.7%

D: 19.8%
D: 28.3%

SD: 2.2%.
SD: 3.3%

Revenue Pooling and Discretionary Spending
Question 16. In making budgetary decisions, we pool all revenue sources to determine the total amount available
for all expenditures, and then we spend the entire pool on activities and projects according to our own discretion.
CZ:
SR:
1

SA: 27%
SA: 19%

A: 68%
A: 73%

U: 1%
U: 5%

D: 4%
D: 3%

SD: 1%
SD: 0%

Another set of inquiries regarding the specific breakdown of municipal expenditures fell under the rubric of

question 17. The responses to that complex of questions yielded a large amount of data that suggest the subject of
another paper. That set of issues, therefore, will not be discussed here.
2See

Holzman’s “Tax Reform in Countries in Transition”, op. cit., p. 242, which indicates that the Czech
Republic also grants exemptions on the VAT for consumer goods “with detrimental consequences for tax
revenue.”
14.

3

Although differences existed in the number of Czech and Slovak managers interviewed, each question considered

for analysis had a sufficient number of responses for reliable statistical testing. In addition all analyses included a
test for the equality of variances and depending on the outcome, the appropriate statistical method for testing
differences between group mean values was selected and used. Unfortunately, we were not informed by the assisting
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associations how many municipals were requested to respond to the survey and are unable to say what the response
percentage was. If the survey was sent to every municipality on line, the Slovak participation rate would have been
around 5%. All Slovak municipalities are not members of ZMOS, so with non-members not receiving the survey, the
response rate would have actually been somewhat higher. Using the same reasoning for the Czech case, we would
estimate the response rate around 12-15%.
4

By way of orientation, in 2005 the dollar exchanged for 24 crowns, whereas in 2002 the exchange rate had been 40

crowns per dollar. By November, 2007, the exchange rate was just under 18 crowns per dollar. In November of
2007 the Euro exchanged for 26.13 Czech crowns.
5

The problem of bailouts has been carefully investigated by Von Hagen et al (2000) and they have illuminated some

important sources of the problem in presenting four case studies of bailouts of subnational governments in Australia,
Germany, Italy and Sweden. Their abstract reports that “the case studies show that bailouts can occur in a diverse set
of institutions shaping the relations between central and subnational governments. Surprisingly, there is little
evidence in favor of the “too big to fail” argument explaining bailouts. In contrast, elements of political favoritism
play some role in most cases. The cases also indicate the importance of properly designing principal-agent
relationships in the decentralization of public finances. Constitutional mandates for uniform provision of public
services and attempts by the central government to dominate subnational governments in matters of fiscal policy
seem to be conducive to bailouts.”
6

Our responses were coded with scores of 1 for SA, 2 for A, 3 for uncertain or unwilling to say, 4 for D and 5 for

SD. Of the 373 responses included in the analysis for the Czech Republic, the mean response for Question one was
2.55 (standard deviation 1.162). For question 2 the mean response was 1.94 (standard deviation .915). The Pearson
Correlation between question 1 (“we operate with autonomy”) and question 2 (“we are dependent on financial
transfers) was only -.059 and the significance of a 1-tailed test was .128, or insignificant at the .05 confidence level.
Regressing the responses to Question 1 on Question 2 yields an R2 no greater than .003, which is not significant at
the .05 confidence level. This is interpreted to mean that the Czech responses to the two questions showed no
statistically significant functional relationship. It was as though the two responses were from different groups, i.e.,
they were answered from two completely different perspectives. It was as though one group of people was
explaining in question 1 that they had decision-making responsibilities and an important job to perform and another
group was explaining in question 2 that their ability to function independently was curtailed significantly by their
dependence upon centrally-provided and –managed financial resources.
For the Slovak case, the mean response for Question one was 2.58 (standard deviation 1.109). For question 2 the
mean response was 2.10 (standard deviation .986). The Pearson Correlation between response 1 (“we operate with
autonomy”) and response 2 (“we are dependent on financial transfers) was only .101, only a little higher than the
Czech case, and the significance of a 1-tailed test was also a little higher at .222, but still far from significant at the
.05 confidence level. Regressing the responses to Question 1 on Question 2 yields an R 2 no greater than .010, which
is not significant at the .05 confidence level. This analysis yields the same result as that of the Czech Republic. T-
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tests of the means of samples for the two countries failed to demonstrate any statistical difference between their
means.
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